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A Perspective on the Houston Economy
t the beginning of the
20th century, Houston was 
riding a wave of economic ex-
pansion that would transform
the Texas economy. Houston
had a population of only 44,600
in 1900, and there were 182,000
residents in what is now the
eight-county metro area, includ-
ing the competing city of Gal-
veston. Between 1875 and
1900, Houston found itself at
the center of the state’s rapidly
maturing rail network, which
for the first time afforded
access to the inland regions of
Texas.
Beginning in 1875, three
resource booms—in cattle, cot-
ton and lumber—transformed
different parts of the state. Cattle
was not a significant Gulf Coast
industry, nor did Houston grow
much cotton or cut much timber.
But the city capitalized on the
expansion of Texas cotton and
lumber production on a grand
scale through its transportation
links, access to capital and
growing managerial expertise.
When Houston was founded
in 1836, its economic role was
that of merchant and trader. It
received and marketed agricul-
tural goods from the country-
side and sent consumer goods,
hardware and other supplies
back to the farm. The original
market area was centered in
seven counties directly west of
the city. The railroad would
later extend Houston’s market
area into the Blackland Prairie
to the north and the Piney
Woods of East Texas.
Houston’s merchant and
trader role continued as the
city’s hinterland expanded. 
But by 1900 Houston had also
developed into an important
regional capital by offering the
best transportation and commu-
nications links and administra-
tive and technical skills on the
Gulf Coast.
This article documents the
Houston economy up to the
turn of the 20th century, when
the city transitioned from growth
powered by cotton and lumber
to growth fueled by oil and the










powered by cotton and
lumber to growth
fueled by oil and the
opening of Houston's
deepwater port. Part 1
covers the years 1836,
the year Houston was
founded, to 1900.Early Transportation
Before the arrival of the rail-
road, much of Texas was iso-
lated and landlocked. A num-
ber of Texas rivers run north 
to south and into the Gulf of
Mexico, but none was navigable
for long distances.
1 Brothers
Augustus C. and John K. Allen
arrived in Texas shortly after the
battle of San Jacinto in search
of the state’s most interior point
with year-round water transpor-
tation to the gulf. They selected
the headwaters of Buffalo
Bayou as the site for the new
city, which they named for Sam
Houston, hero of San Jacinto.
The Allen brothers founded
Houston to provide an inland
market for the produce of the
rich agricultural region along
the Brazos River bottoms.
Houston merchants shipped the
produce on to Galveston Bay,
where it was loaded on coastal
vessels headed to New Orleans
or Matamoros. In return for
cotton, sugar, wool and hides
from the interior, Houston mer-
chants provided consumer goods
and hardware for the farms and
plantations.
Cutting 50 miles off the trip
to Galveston Bay was a sig-
nificant step forward in 1836.
Interior travel in Texas at that
time was by stagecoach for
passengers, ox- or mule-drawn
freighter for goods. Oxcarts or
Conestoga wagons typically
carried about 7 tons of freight.
Rates were high, as much as $1
per 100 pounds per 100 miles.
Roads were often quarter-mile-
wide ruts that turned to bog
when it rained. According to
John Stricklin Spratt, “In tim-
bered regions, roads were clas-
sified according to the height
of the stump, and where none
were higher than six inches,
the road was [considered] first
class.”
2
At peak market periods in
winter, ox-drawn freighters lined
Houston streets. But there were
few bridges, and winter rains
brought mud and high water
that could shut down Houston
business for a week or more.
The difficulty of getting
goods out of the interior before
the Civil War can also be illus-
trated by the inland port of Jef-
ferson on Cypress Bayou in
northeast Texas—a distant sec-
ond to Houston in terms of
cargo volume. The bayou was
navigable only a few months of
the year, but it allowed cotton
to move across Caddo Lake to
Louisiana and ultimately down-
river to New Orleans.
Bad roads persisted in Texas
well into the 20th century. Be-
ginning in 1882, downtown
Houston experimented with
planks, bricks, macadam, gravel,
and blocks of limestone, cypress
and bois d’arc. But by 1903,
the city still had only 26 miles
of paved roads. The first all-
weather road to Galveston (a
necessary precursor for a truck-




The agricultural riches and
population density surrounding
pre–Civil War Houston, along
with the high cost of freight,
prompted construction of a
railroad network radiating from
Houston. Texas’ first railroad
was built by Gen. Sidney Sher-
man in 1850 in an attempt to
revive the town of Harrisburg,
seven miles south of Houston.
Just as the Buffalo Bayou, Bra-
zos and Colorado Railway
reached the Brazos River bot-
tomlands in 1856, the city of
Houston built a connecting
line, the Tap Railroad, to fore-
stall expansion at Harrisburg.
Houston later sold the Tap
Railroad to private interests,
which extended it 50 miles to
the southeast, to the sugarcane
fields of Brazoria County. In
1857 a third line, the Houston
and Texas Central, reached 50
miles northwest from Houston
to Hempstead.
The first train reached Gal-
veston Island from Houston in
1860, and by 1861 the Texas
and New Orleans Railroad had
completed 100 miles of track
running east from Houston to
Beaumont and Port Arthur. 
This Gulf Coast web of rail-
roads, all centered in Houston,
accounted for 90 percent of the
state’s track on the eve of the
Civil War.
The railroads solved the 
difficult problem of intercity
transportation. Reconstruction
brought a burst of railroad
building in Texas. Half the
track built in the 19th century
(4,548 miles) was laid between
1875 and 1885, and by 1900
Texas was No. 1 among the
states in miles laid.
4 By 1910,
17 railroads served Houston,
and only one more would fol-
low—the Missouri Pacific in
1927. By the turn of the cen-
tury, the railroads had reached
all parts of the state.
The Texas Cattle Industry
Railroads opened the state’s
resources to intensive and
rapid exploitation. Cattle, cot-
ton and lumber boomed. Hous-
ton was at the center of this
railway expansion from the
beginning. Not only did the
extent of the hinterland served
by Houston’s merchants and
traders grow rapidly after 1875;
economic activity within the
region flourished as well.
The rapid but short-lived
expansion of the cattle industry
across the Great Plains had lit-
tle impact on the upper Texas
2Gulf Coast. As Walter Prescott
Webb points out, the birthplace
of the Texas cattle industry lay
deep in South Texas, within a
diamond-shaped area running
from San Antonio to Laredo, on
to Matamoros, and then along
the lower Gulf Coast as far as
Old Indianola.
5 The combina-
tion of Mexican cattle, abun-
dant grass, water and horses
created a vast agricultural area
that served as the foundation
of San Antonio’s economy well
into the 20th century.
With the arrival of the rail-
roads west of the Mississippi 
in 1866, the cattle industry ex-
ploded onto the Great Plains.
Removal of Native Americans
and decimation of buffalo herds
created vast areas of open
range. Long cattle drives started
in Texas and ended at Missouri
and Kansas railheads. But by
1885 overgrazing, homesteading
and barbed-wire fences had
largely ended the era of the
open range. As the railroads
moved onto the plains, the 
cattle industry transformed
itself once more by raising
improved breeds of cattle in
large fenced-in pastures, with
water provided by windmills.
While the cattle boom made
a lasting impact on Texas folk-
lore, cotton and lumber dwarfed
it in economic impact. Houston
was well positioned to profit
from both Blackland Prairie
cotton and East Texas timber.
Cotton and the Blackland Prairie
Commercial cotton planting
came to Texas in 1821, when
Louisiana planters arrived seek-
ing free land from the Mexican
government. Seven counties
along the Brazos River just west
of Houston (Austin, Brazoria,
Colorado, Fayette, Fort Bend,
Washington and Wharton)











important early cash crops, but
especially cotton.
After the Civil War, the
Blackland Prairie region to the
north of Houston gradually dis-
placed the Brazos Valley as the
state’s leading cotton-producing
area. The end of slavery dis-
rupted the Gulf Coast’s planta-
tion-based system. Meanwhile,
the prairie regions of northeast
Texas opened up to agriculture
for reasons similar to the devel-
opment of the cattle industry in
West Texas and the Panhandle:
removal of Native American
and buffalo populations, arrival
of the railroad and the barbed-
wire fence. However, the Black-
land Prairie had the added
advantages of access to national
markets via rail and the devel-
opment of a sod plow to break
up the prairie soils.
So the area’s population
exploded. Thousands of immi-
grants poured in from the
upper Southern states and from
Europe. As cotton took hold, a
system of small-farm owners,
sharecroppers and tenant farm-
ers spread rapidly, replacing
slavery. In 1899, according to
the Census of Agriculture, 18
Blackland Prairie counties,
stretching from the Red River
through Dallas and southwest
to Austin, produced 972,000
bales of cotton, while the
seven Brazos Valley counties
produced only 216,000 bales.
6
Dallas quickly became a
major cotton-processing center.
By the 1920s it would be the
world’s largest inland cotton
market. Further, the cotton gin
machinery industry, which
began in the 1880s, would
make the city the world’s sec-
ond largest manufacturer of
farm equipment by the turn of
the century.
7 At the same time,
Dallas began to develop an
important banking and life
insurance sector, as companies
such as Southwestern Life and
Southland Life opened in the
first decade of the century.
Smaller Blackland Prairie
communities also experienced
rapid population and economic
growth due to cotton. Wilmer
and Richardson sprang up on
the route of the Houston and
Texas Central, the first railroad
to reach Dallas from the south
in 1872. Grand Prairie and
Mesquite were established on
the route of the Texas and
Pacific, the next railway to
arrive in Dallas from the east.
Greenville, a connecting point
for four railroads by 1899, be-
came a leading cotton-marketing
location. Its population nearly
tripled, from 3,000 in 1884 to
8,500 by 1900. By 1912, Green-
ville would have a daily paper,
three weeklies, two national
banks, two opera houses and
an ice factory.
8 Similar success
stories could be told for other
North Texas towns, such as
Commerce, Denton, McKinney
and Waxahachie.
Table 1 shows the popula-
tion of the state’s largest cities
from 1890 to 1910, as the
3
Table 1
Population of Texas Cities, 1890–1910
Growth rate,
1890–1910
1890 1900 1910 (percent)
Houston 27,557 44,633 78,800 5.4
Galveston 29,084 37,789 36,981 1.2
Dallas 38,067 42,638 92,104 4.5
Fort Worth 23,076 26,668 73,312 5.9
San Antonio 37,673 53,321 96,614 4.8
Austin 14,575 22,258 29,860 3.7
SOURCE: U.S. Census, various years.development of the Blackland
Prairie reached its zenith. From
the Civil War until 1890, San
Antonio and Galveston had
shared the No. 1 and No. 2
positions in population among
the state’s cities. But in 1890,
Dallas briefly surged into the
lead. It would be 1930 before
the pattern would be set for
the rest of the century, with
Houston and Dallas as the
state’s top two cities.
Using a more modern per-
spective, however, Table 2
describes the populations of
these cities as they reflect cur-
rent metropolitan statistical
areas. The combined Dallas
and Fort Worth consolidated
metropolitan statistical area
(CMSA) in 1900 surges to twice
the size of the Houston CMSA,
and Austin (also in the Black-
land Prairie) pulls close to
Houston. Dallas took advan-
tage of the population density
in its hinterland to spur its own
growth by building four inter-
urban electric railways into the
surrounding communities and
sponsoring weekly Dallas























and business advantages of
Houston’s location. Monroe D.
Anderson opened the Houston
office of Anderson, Clayton,
then headquartered in Okla-
homa City, in 1907. Partners
Ben and Will Clayton and
Frank Anderson, Monroe’s
brother, would arrive over the
next several years, and the
company would be reorganized
in Texas in 1920. Anderson,
Clayton would become the
world’s largest cotton-marketing
firm after the opening of the
Houston Ship Channel.
According to Will Clayton,
“We moved to Houston because
Houston was at the little end of
the funnel that drained all of
Texas and the Oklahoma terri-
tory…in other words, we were
at the back door and wanted to
be at the front door.”
10
Anderson, Clayton thrived
by integrating its business from
field to mill: ginning, compress-
ing, warehousing and transport-
ing. With mills located mostly
outside the state, rail and water
links through Houston were




banking, and not only in
dealing with cotton itself,
but in carrying on transac-
tions with many foreign
countries and the curren-
cies of those countries. In
many cases, they had to be
organizers or purchasers or
operators of warehouses,
vegetable oil mills, refiner-
ies and cotton gins….Some
had to be qualified as
diplomats who knew how
to deal with government
officials and with great
bankers in other countries.
11
Thus, Houston and Dallas
began differentiating their terri-
torial approaches early in the
last century. In 1900 Dallas was
clearly focused inward, building
an economic territory in North
Texas; today it serves as an im-
portant financial center and dis-
tribution point for Texas, Okla-
homa and Arkansas. Houston’s
focus turned outward, and today
it is home to the nation’s largest
foreign port and the state’s for-
eign business community.
East Texas Lumber
The other wave of economic
activity brought by the railroads
and helping shape the Houston
of 1900 was East Texas lumber.
The great stands of pine had
largely been ignored because
of a lack of transportation and
access to export markets.
Because of its superior access
to capital and its communica-
tions and transportation link-
ages, Houston would assume
financial and administrative
control of much of the industry
despite its location at the very
edge of the eastern forests.
The first large-scale lumber
mills in Texas were established
in Beaumont in 1876 and 1878.
Logs were originally floated
down the Sabine River to Beau-
Table 2
Population of Selected Texas Metro Areas (1890–1910)
Under the Current Definition of MSA, PMSA and CMSA
Growth rate,
1890–1910
1890 1900 1910 (percent)
Texas 2,235,523 3,048,710 3,896,542 2.8
Houston PMSA 76,959 122,785 176,598 4.2
Galveston MSA 31,476 44,116 44,479 1.7
Brazoria MSA 11,506 14,861 13,299 .7
Houston CMSA 119,941 181,762 234,376 3.4
Dallas PMSA 228,581 320,362 381,298 2.6
Fort Worth MSA 92,751 121,164 179,371 3.4
Dallas–Fort Worth 321,332 441,526 560,669 2.8
CMSA
San Antonio MSA 81,496 111,776 170,029 3.7
Austin MSA 110,088 148,210 162,947 2.0
NOTE: MSA, metropolitan statistical area; PMSA, primary MSA; CMSA, consolidated
MSA, consisting of the primary MSA plus any adjacent MSAs.
SOURCE: U.S. Census, various years.
4mont and Orange, but railroads
quickly replaced water trans-
port. Before the Civil War, the
railroads had only skirted the
edge of the East Texas Piney
Woods. The Houston East and
West Texas Railway was the
first to enter the region, cross-
ing the San Jacinto River from
Houston to Cleveland, Living-
ston and Moscow. By the time
this railroad reached Cleveland,
five lumber mills were operat-
ing in its wake. In 1886, when
it reached Shreveport, it was
the most important railroad in
the region. Other railroads fol-
lowed, reaching into the Tyler
and Lufkin areas from the east
or west. Dozens of logging rail-
roads developed off each main
line to serve the sawmills.
By the turn of the century,
lumber had become the state’s
dominant manufacturing indus-
try measured by either employ-
ment or value added. Lumber
did not rival cotton as an eco-
nomic power, however; in 1900,
there were 225,000 cotton farms
and 22 million acres under cul-
tivation.
12 In 1907, when the
lumber industry peaked, 2.25
million board feet was cut; 99
large mills accounted for over
half of this production.
13
In one important sense,
Houston’s economic role relative
to lumber was unchanged from
when the city was founded.
Houston still operated as mer-
chant and trader, using the new
railroads into the Piney Woods




center of the region’s lumber
mill operations, with logs or cut
lumber moving to Beaumont
by rail and then shipped out of
Port Arthur. However, Houston
controlled the lumber market
through the companies of such
men as John Henry Kirby and
Jesse H. Jones. Houston-based
operations controlled 40 per-
cent of the 1.1 million board
feet cut in 1899.
14 The lumber
never entered Houston but went
directly from East Texas mills
to customers in other parts of
Texas (60 percent), in states
north of Texas (24 percent),
and in Europe and Mexico 
(16 percent).
Houston’s advantages over
Beaumont were size, better
transportation and communica-
tion links, and business sophis-
tication.
15 Houston had become
a regional gateway, with 60
years of experience in capital-
izing on the development of
Texas’ natural resources.
The Regional City
The focus of city building
before the railroad arrived was
to serve the largest and richest
surrounding territory possible.
Certainly, Houston used the rail-
roads to cement existing ties to
the Brazos Valley and to expand
its hinterland into East Texas.
However, with completion
of the rail network in Texas
and connection of the state’s
cities to the eastern United
States, the toolbox for achieving
economic growth expanded.
Sales of manufactured goods to
the hinterland remained impor-
tant to the city, but sales to
other large cities were now
possible. For much of the 19th
century, sales from Texas to
the rest of the nation had been
primarily confined to raw or
semiprocessed agricultural
goods. Cheap, reliable rail
transportation opened the door
for Houston to specialize in
manufactured goods and be-
come a supplier to other Texas
or national cities.
Today, it is easy to identify
urban economic specialization:
autos in Detroit, financial serv-
ices in New York, software in
San Jose, oil services in Hous-
ton. Similarly good data are 
not available on movement of
goods in Texas in 1900; how-
ever, we can infer much about
specialization in 1900 by deter-
mining the pattern of employ-
ment and wages paid in spe-
cific manufacturing industries
and examining how the pattern
varies across cities. A high con-
centration of employment or
wages paid in a particular in-
dustry and city would suggest
urban specialization and local
exports of that industry’s prod-
ucts from that city.
16 Differences
in specialization between cities
and the surrounding country-
side can tell us about the exis-
tence and direction of trade
between city and hinterland.
To investigate Texas’ urban
exports to other cities in 1900,
we selected Houston, Dallas
and San Antonio as well as 18
other cities in the southeastern
United States or the Midwest.
We then chose 22 manufacturing
industries that had both em-
ployment and wages reported
in 1900 for all three Texas cities.
Reporting for these industries
was generally good in the other
18 cities as well.
Table 3 lists the 22 indus-
tries considered and the flow
of trade for each between the
three Texas cities and their sur-
rounding areas.
17 In 1900 Texas
cities and their hinterlands gen-
erally enjoyed a lively trade in
these goods and services. In
the table, “h to c” indicates a
good typically sold from the
hinterland to the city (black-
smithing and saddlery, for ex-
ample); “c to h” indicates the
reverse flow (plumbing, foundry
and machine shop products);
and “local” means no trade
occurs (photography, house
5and sign painting). The results
shown here are for wage data,
but the results are similar for
employment data. While details
vary, both analyses indicate
extensive intraregional interac-
tion for all Texas cities.
Specialization and Intercity Trade
Initially, isolated cities pro-
duce all goods for themselves
and their hinterland. For some
goods, however, transportation
links among cities will allow
specialization of production,
and only a few cities will see
their local industry grow to
serve the others. In other words,
after specialization occurs and
trade emerges, the variance in
the concentration of activity
among cities should be high.
18
In contrast, if a good is not
traded and does not move from
city to city, the concentration
of activity should be similar in
each city and its variance low
across cities.
Using the low-variance cri-
terion, the nontraded goods
among our 21 cities include
custom millinery, plumbing,
dyeing and cleaning, men’s
custom work clothes and their
repair, printing and publishing
of newspapers and periodicals,
photography, metalsmithing,
and house and sign painting.
The highest variations dis-
played among our 21 cities
were for the eight industries
listed in Table 4. These indus-
tries are our best candidates 
for intercity trade. The ques-
tions that arise are whether the
three Texas cities participate 
as specialists in production 
of these goods and whether
they export these goods to
other cities.
Table 4 shows concentration
ratios, or location quotients,
which are the percentage of
manufacturing wages or employ-
ment in the industry for that
city divided by the average per-
centage for all 21 cities. A ratio
of 1 indicates a normal concen-
tration, equal to the
average for all cities. 
A ratio of 1.2 indicates a
concentration of activity
20 percent higher than
normal (shown in bold
in the table). Because a
high level of activity
indicates potential ex-
ports, we chose 20 per-
cent and above to indi-
cate likely export activity.
Location quotients based
on both wages and jobs
are given.
As seen in the table, in
1900 Dallas specialized
in printing and publish-




products. Some of these
exports are probably
indirect—from providing
inputs to other exported
goods. Carpentry and black-
smithing, for example, are
likely to be inputs to Dallas’
large cotton gin and farm
implement industry. Similarly,
Houston exported carpentry,
probably in support of produc-
ing and repairing railroad cars.
Houston and San Antonio both
exported confectionary, and
San Antonio exported bread
and bakery goods as well as
printed material, saddlery and
blacksmith services.
Thus, we see the emerg-
ence of urban specialization in
Texas as early as 1900. Among
the 22 selected industries, the
eight most likely to be traded
all have a presence in Texas,
with a high concentration in 
at least one of Texas’ three
major cities. The state’s gradual
shift in focus from farm to fac-
tory would become the most
important demographic and
economic change of the last
century.
Table 3
Relationship of City and Hinterland: Flow of Trade and Its Direction, 1900
Industry Dallas Houston San Antonio
Bicycle and tricycle repair local local local
Blacksmithing and wheelwrighting h to c h to c h to c
Boots and shoes, custom work and repair h to c h to c h to c
Bread and bakery products local local c to h
Carpentering local local local
Clothing, men’s custom work and repair c to h local c to h
Confectionary local h to c h to c
Dyeing and cleaning c to h c to h c to h
Foundry and machine shop products c to h c to h c to h
Furniture, cabinetmaking, repairing and upholstering local local local
Lock- and gunsmithing local local local
Lumber, planing mill products c to h c to h local
Millinery, custom work h to c h to c h to c
Painting, house, sign, etc. local local local
Photography local local local
Plumbing, gas and steamfitting c to h c to h c to h
Printing and publishing, book and job c to h c to h c to h
Printing and publishing, newpapers and periodicals h to c h to c h to c
Saddlery and harness h to c h to c h to c
Tinsmithing, coppersmithing and sheet-iron working local h to c h to c
Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes c to h local c to h
Watch, clock and jewelry repair h to c h to c h to c
NOTE: c to h = typical flow of goods is from city to hinterland; c to h = the opposite; and local = no flow between city and hinterland.
SOURCES: Census of Manufactures, 1900; authors’ calculations from urban wage data.
6Conclusion
By the beginning of the 20th
century, the resource boom
that had driven the Texas econ-
omy since 1875 was coming to
an end. By 1900, as the state’s
railroad network neared com-
pletion, cattle, lumber and cot-
ton had already reached their
peak or were rapidly approach-
ing it. The railroads forever
changed the state’s cities, pro-
viding cheap and easy trans-
portation and giving rise to
urban exports and intercity
competition.
But a new set of economic
forces would have to drive the
Texas economy into the next
century. The next issue of
Houston Business will look for-
ward from 1900 at the eco-
nomic impact of two events
that ensured Houston’s growth
throughout the 20th century—
the destruction of rival Galves-
ton by a hurricane in Septem-
ber 1900 and the discovery of
oil at Spindletop in January 1901.
— Robert W. Gilmer
Camella Clements
Clements was a summer intern in
economics at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas Houston Branch 
in 2001.
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Table 4
Concentration of Selected Export Industries in Texas Cities, 1900
Based on wages Based on jobs
Dallas Houston San Antonio Dallas Houston San Antonio
Carpentering 1.00 2.62 .20 1.29 2.83 .29
Bread and bakery products .65 .84 3.78 .57 .75 1.66
Printing and publishing, book and job 1.58 .83 2.29 1.50 .87 2.42
Tobacco 1.19 .16 .42 1.74 .28 .62
Lumber and planing mill products 1.27 .68 .27 1.04 .85 .29
Confectionary .61 2.05 7.64 .59 2.47 7.13
Saddlery and harness 9.23 .44 3.64 11.06 .45 4.24
Blacksmithing and wheelwrighting 5.19 .94 1.69 2.23 1.13 2.02
NOTE: Values greater than 1.20 (in bold) indicate likely export activity.
SOURCES: Census of Manufactures, 1900; authors’ calculations.
7creased cost of production due
to higher oil and gas prices. 
Real Estate
The Enron effect is taking 
a toll on the downtown office
market and spreading to the
Galleria area. Office absorption
was negative by nearly 2 million
square feet in the second quar-
ter, with the central business
district and the Galleria area
roughly dividing the losses. 
It was the worst absorption 
figure since the early 1990s. 
Upscale apartments inside
the loop or near downtown
have seen a slight increase in
vacancy rates, while class B
apartments outside the loop
have made gains. Citywide,
rents are up about 4 percent
over the past year. Sales of
existing single-family homes
continue to register solid im-
provement, up 10 percent in
April from a year earlier. In
contrast, new home sales were
off about 5 percent through the
first quarter.
balance sheets are driving
improved drilling activity.
Refining and Petrochemicals
Refiners hurried to finish
the turnaround season so they
could take advantage of im-
proving profit margins. Instead
they found crude oil prices ris-
ing in response to turmoil in
the Middle East and wholesale
gasoline prices falling slightly
due to increased production.
The result has been downward
pressure on profit margins and
cutbacks in production in
recent weeks. 
Petrochemical producers
have experienced strong de-
mand since early spring, partly
driven by inventory accumula-
tion. Until this spring, basic
petrochemicals had been readily
available and their prices had
been falling for a year or
more—giving customers little
incentive to hold inventory. 
As rising oil and natural
gas prices drove up production
costs, however, there was a
surge in demand by customers
seeking to rebuild inventory in
advance of price hikes. This
restocking continues, but it is
now apparent that the eco-
nomic recovery is also playing
a significant role in increasing
demand. Excess capacity is still
a problem for most products,
and it continues to limit profits.
Numerous price increases have
been implemented, but most
are simply covering the in-
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ob losses seem to have
ended last fall, when the Hous-
ton economy reached bottom
at –8,000 jobs, or –0.4 percent.
Local employment is still down
3,000 from the April 2001 peak,
but the last three months have
brought slow gains. An April
turnaround in the domestic rig
count and a return of the Hous-
ton Purchasing Managers Index
to the break-even level point 
to likely expansion through the
second half of 2002.
Retail and Auto Sales
Retail sales continue soft,
and expectations are for con-
tinued weakness through 2002.
Retailer pessimism for much of
this year has been rewarded.
Retailers who planned for weak
sales have not been badly hurt
by bloated inventories or forced
into last-minute promotions. 
A strong March was good
news for auto dealers. Sales
were up 14 percent from the
year earlier, but April wiped
out these gains with a 20 per-
cent decline. Year-to-date auto
sales are off 5 percent com-
pared with the same period last
year. 
Oil Services
The domestic rig count has
picked up sharply, with seven
consecutive weeks of increases
and a 16 percent gain. The in-
creases have mostly been land-
based and gas-directed, but
respondents indicate that back-
logs are building for offshore
work, and day rates offshore
are just beginning to rise.
Higher oil and natural gas
prices, improved cash flows
for producers and healthier
J
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